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This paper intends to reexamine commonly accepted view on association of legal rules with 
corporate governance and financial markets. It summarizes findings of a number of empirical 
studies and gives view of current thinking on association between legal rules and financial systems 
characterized by ownership patterns, nature of equity, governance structure, finance behavior and 
capital structure. Nature and effectiveness of financial systems across countries can be partly traced 
to the differences in legal structures. On the other hand, legal systems are products of different 
governance and financial systems that place different “demands” on legal institutions. Thus, on the 
issue of causality, we argue that legal systems evolve as a reflection, as well as a cause, of different 
governance and financial systems. The practical implication is that few strong conclusions can be 







This paper is an excerpt from larger study that will be the final product of research on the 
impact of legal rules on corporate ownership, governance and financial markets. The topic is of 
great practical importance for reforms that are currently on agenda of the FRY. I am very grateful to 
ICER to enable me to make this research, particularly to become acquainted with the Italian 
corporate governance and financial system.    
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LEGAL RULES, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
 The paper summarizes findings of a number of empirical studies1 and gives view of current 
thinking on association between legal rules and financial systems characterized by ownership 
patterns, nature of equity, governance structure, finance behavior and capital structure.  
Studies suggest that nature and effectiveness of financial systems across countries can be 
partly explained by differences in legal structure. Thus, causality goes from legal structures to 
governance patterns and financial systems. On the other hand, our view is that legal systems evolve 
as products of different governance and financial systems. Therefore, in the analytical framework 
that relates the theory of corporate governance and corporate finance with legal rules, we argue that 
legal structure is a reflection, as well as a cause, of different governance and financial systems. 
Interconnectedness2 of the theory of corporate governance, corporate finance and financial systems 
with legal rules is analyzed in the contractual - transaction cost framework analysis. 
The topic is of great practical importance for reforms that have been on agenda of both, 
developed market economies and transition economies. The globalization of capital markets and 
emerging markets in transition economies raises the issue whether some characteristics of corporate 
ownership and governance structures by affecting the liquidity of capital markets, affect the firm’s 
access to capital. We assume that different governance structures and corresponding capital markets 
perform better in some sectors. Thus, smaller and narrower capital markets do not necessarily mean 
that firms are constrained to grow because the access to external finance is reduced. Other forms 
(retained earnings) of financing could always be used, depending on sector to which firms belong.   
Interconnectedness of economic and legal devices for reducing informational asymmetry 
(agency problems) is discussed in the first section of the paper. Exogenous character of legal rules 
is adopted in studies that are reviewed in this paper. Therefore, the second section briefly comments 
on methodological concept of legal rules as exogenous variables. The third section summarizes 
findings of a number of empirical studies about the association between legal rules and corporate 
ownership, corporate governance and development of financial markets. Also, findings are analyzed 
in the light of whether the country’s particular legal structure and/or legal origin affect corporate 
                                                 
1These studies trace legal determinants of ownership patterns /See for example: La Porta,R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and 
Shleifer,A (1999)/ or governance systems  /Shleifer,A. and Vishny,R., (1997)/ or legal determinants of external finance 
/La Porta,R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F.,Shleifer,A. and Vishny,R., (1997)/ or impact of the development of financial 
systems on investment and growth of firms /Rajan,R. and Zingales,L., (1995), Rajan,R. and Zingales,L.,(1998)/, etc. 
2Recent literature relates the theory of governance structures with the theory of corporate finance. Explicitly or 
implicitly legal rules and their enforcement are taken into account as determinants of governance structures, methods of 
corporate financing and financial markets. For example:  Williamson, O.E., (1988), Aghion, P. and Bolton, P., (1989), 
Miller, G.,(1996), Israel, R., (1991). 
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financing and firm’s access to capital. Within the broader perspective of the variety of governance 
structures and financial systems, we sometimes refer to the Italian model because most of the 
systems around the world seem to be closer to the Italian model than to the models that are in 
economic theory thought to be the best. It means that large firms tend to be family controlled and to 
rely predominantly on internal financing. The fourth section is focused on policy recommendations 
for reforming corporate governance and financial markets. Transition economies, their institutional 
and legal reforms regarding financial markets are the subject matter of the fifth section.  
1. Economic and Legal Institutions as Devices for Reducing Informational Asymmetry 
Complex institutional structures – economic and legal - work to constrain contractual parties 
in their opportunistic behavior, thus to reduce informational asymmetry and minimize agency costs. 
Various theoretical strands of the new institutional economics3, emphasize different problems 
arising from incomplete contracting, all of them just being the aspects of the same transaction costs 
problem4.  
Institutions – economic and legal are transaction cost economizing devices. Their function is 
to reduce costs of global contractual governance5 - across markets and within the firm. Modern 
theory of the firm is based on the concept of the firm as a set of contracts6 and many phenomena 
related to the firm (ownership structure, governance, finance and financial markets, the choice of 
capital structure, corporate law) can be explained by considerations of incomplete contracting. 
Contractual approach to theory of the firm and to the theory of corporate finance focuses on the 
relation between ownership structure and control rights assignment7.  Ownership and control over 
firm need not to coincide. The separation between the two may create governance structures 
(control) that are not based on ownership (like fiduciary duties, trust, coalitions). Contracts (and/or 
legal rules) are supposed to assign control over firm in a way that aligns the interests of different 
parties within the firm. Informational asymmetry and opportunism of contractual parties create 
agency costs that affect the firm's value. Economic and legal institutions deal with two major and 
often overlapping forms of agency costs based on informational asymmetry. One form is the 
                                                 
3The new institutional economics has different ramifications (property rights approach, contractual approach, 
transaction costs and social norms approach) that are all just different dimensions of the same methodological approach.  
4Transaction costs are costs of exchanging property rights. Different authors  focus on different sources and aspects of 
transaction costs - informational asymmetry, principal-agent problem, bounded rationality and opportunism, 
expropriation, moral hazard, performance measurement or costs of resource coordination. See: Williamson, O., (1985), 
Alchian, A. and Woodward, S., (1988), Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., (1976), Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H., (1972).  
5Guelpa, F., (1997). 
6Coase, R., (1937), Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H., (1972), Jensen, M. and Meckling, W.H., (1976), Fama, E. and Jensen, 
M., (1983) Hart, O., (1995), Williamson, O., (1985).  
7Grossman, S., and Hart, O., (1986). 
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shareholders-manager relation and the other form is the relationship between controlling and non-
controlling shareholders.  
So, parties within firm face the problem of finding out economic methods and devices for 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, and/or controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders in order to discourage managers and/or controlling shareholders to divert too much of 
the firm’s net income to themselves. Those methods range from making the managerial 
compensation dependent on the performance of the firm, firing managers, leveraged buyouts, 
paying dividends, takeovers, risk of bankruptcy, etc. 
The role of legal protection is to reduce informational asymmetry by implying in corporate 
charters those rights that shareholders would insist upon in order to invest in the corporation. 
Besides voting rights and dividend entitlement, they insist upon the membership in the board of 
directors and some other rights. But the shareholders are not homogenous group. So, their rights 
and their stake in the corporation determine the level of protection they expect to be provided in the 
corporate charter. It is not the same level of protection required for controlling shareholders and for 
minority shareholders. 
Legal systems are equipped to deal with agency problems in different ways and each has 
different costs and benefits. Legal devices provide safeguard for investors, particularly non-
controlling. Excessive protection of non-controlling investors allows their interference in control 
and reduces incentives of the controller to behave efficiently. On the other side, poor protection of 
investors, particularly non-controlling shareholders reduces their incentives to offer capital because 
it hinders the efficient transfer of control8. 
2. Reviewed Empirical Studies and the Problem of Causality 
     A great body of the empirical literature on the firm’s governance, finance and financial 
systems confirms that differences in legal protection of investors explain much of the differences in 
governance and financial systems in the world. Thus, legal rules are exogenous variable. Legal rules 
are measured by quality of legal protection of investors and level of their enforcement. In some of 
the studies, countries are classified according to their legal origin9 and not according to actual legal 
rules (commercial codes) in order to avoid endogeneity of legal rules. According to authors, 
endogenous rules may be imposed as a result of lobbying of powerful political and economic 
groups. A variable in economic model will be endogenous or exogenous depending on what is 
chosen as an object of investigation. By assuming that legal rules are exogenous, legal rules are 
                                                 
8Barka, F., (1997) argues that excessive control hinders the efficient transfer of control. The Italian economic literature 
is concerned that the excessive control-enhancing devices seen in family, coalition control and in pyramidal group 
structures endanger the need for well-balanced relation between the protection devices and control-enhancing devices.  
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understood as given variables within an economic model. Legal rules are, thus, taken as key 
explanatory variables for understanding economic devices (such as ownership patterns, governance 
structures, corporate finance and financial markets) that reduce informational asymmetry. It means 
that one direction causation is ascribed to the association of legal rules with ownership patterns, 
governance structures and financial systems. Causation goes from legal rules/legal origins to 
corporate governance patterns, financial markets, firms’ access to external finance and to costs of 
capital. This explanation of the association of legal rules and economic variables have strong policy 
implications regarding the possible designing of legal systems.    
Other possible approach to the causation issue is the neo-institutional approach. The neo-
institutional concepts of informational asymmetry and transaction costs reduction within the firm 
and across the markets are essential to understand a variety of corporate ownership structures, 
governance structures, financial market systems and the capital structures.  
In the theoretical framework of neo-institutional economics legal rules (institutions in 
general) are endogenous variables that are chosen by economic agents. Legal rules are endogenous 
and choice variables. Economic agents chose legal rules the same way they chose governance 
structures, financial systems or whether to sell and buy goods. Within the neo-institutional 
framework association of legal and economic devices is not one side causation10. Their endogenous 
character suggests possible future line of research in modeling the association of legal rules and 
corporate governance, ownership structure and financial markets as endogenous variables.   
The neo-institutional economics approach explains why it is a good methodological choice 
to capture the quality of legal rules by legal origin of the country.  Quality of legal rules comes from 
economic pressures within the system, from numerous contractual relationships and property rights 
arrangements and social norms and values in a society.  On the other side quality of legal rules 
determine the quality of economic process. Thus, we can say that shareholder protection is 
determined by economic forces and some broader culture reflected in legal origin.  
However, in spite of the endogenous methodological treatment of legal rules, the reviewed 
studies give an important and valuable insight in the association of legal rules and more general 
structure of financial markets and governance structures. 
3.  Legal Rules Governance Structures, Corporate Finance and Financial Markets 
Governance structures are about how the suppliers of capital safeguard returns on their 
investment. In regard of governance structures and corresponding types of financial markets, there 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9Legal origin is highly correlated with shareholder protection. 
10If legal rules are choice variables, then company law and, even broader. the whole body of economic laws can be 
understood as standard contract. See: Easterbrook, F. and Fischel, D., (1991).  
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are huge institutional and legal differences among countries across the world. In spite of these 
differences, some countries demonstrate similar level of economic development. They demonstrate 
that access to external finance depends on the level of legal protection of investors, and not contrary 
to expectations, whether they belong to bank oriented or market oriented financial system as 
theoretically extreme variants of financial systems.  
3.1.  Legal Rules and Governance Structures  
Brief description of the two extreme theoretical models of financial systems is as follows: 
 Economic theory usually associates dispersed ownership (widely held corporations) with 
market-oriented Anglo-American model11 of financial system in which most of the financial 
institutions are precluded or unwilling to play a major role in corporate governance. Dispersed 
ownership gives rise to stock markets as devices against opportunistic behavior of managers and 
takeovers are synonym for corporate governance. On the other side concentrated ownership is 
associated with bank-oriented German model12 of financial system. Banks and financial institutions 
play a major role in corporate governance by holding their own equity or by voting on behalf of 
other investors. However, in the most of the world, corporations typically have controlling owners. 
Even in the US corporate ownership is not completely dispersed and concentrated holdings can be 
seen more often than expected. 
Regarding ownership patterns, the empirical evidence13 suggests that the large publicly held 
corporations have large shareholders with ultimate control and that they are active in corporate 
governance. The evidence confirms that on average 36% of largest firms are widely held. On the 
other side, on average 30% of the largest firms are family14 controlled and 18% are state controlled. 
It is interesting that Japan classified as bank-controlled system has widely held 18 out of 20 largest 
firms. There are countries like Argentina, Greece, Austria, Hong-Kong, Portugal, Israel and 
Belgium that could hardly be said to have any widely held firm. The same conclusion applies for 
Italy15. 
This result is in contrast to the widespread belief that large corporation are widely held. 
Evidence confirms that there is a negligent number of widely held large corporations in a countries 
                                                 
11It is depicted as outsider system of the UK and the US where ownership is dispersed among large number of 
individuals and institutional investors, where cross-shareholdings are rare and where takeover activity is lively. 
12It is depicted as insider system of Continental Europe and Japan where ownership of  an individual firm is in hands of 
small number of families, banks and other firms and where cross-shareholdings are common place. 
13La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999) tested whether usual image of corporation as widely held  
by small shareholders correspond to reality. For data and explanation of variables see La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, 
F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), p.474-477. 
14Family control solves agency problem of separation of ownership and control but raises a problem of dynamic and 
static efficiency in distribution of skills and ownership. See: Barka, F., (1995). 
15See: Caprio, L. and Floreani, A.,(1996). 
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with poor shareholder protection. Equity markets of continental Europe play limited role with 
exceptions of Netherlands and Sweden16. In countries with good shareholder protection as in 
common law countries, the incidence of widely held corporation is more often and, as a 
consequence, they have bigger and more liquid equity markets. Irrespectively of the type of 
financial system, the largest firms tend to have controlling shareholders with the exception of the 
US. Nevertheless, modest concentration of ownership is reported17 in the US largest corporations, 
contrary to their usual image as widely held. 
 Significant concentration of ownership is reported for Germany, Japan and Italy18 and 
heavily concentrated ownership for developing countries19.  Concentration of ownership and 
corresponding governance arrangement which provides the separation of cash flow from control 
rights can be achieved through different economic and/or legal instruments: multiple classes of 
stock (deviation from one-share-vote-one), cross-shareholdings20, pyramidal ownership structures, 
takeovers and participation of owners in management21. The most important mechanisms, as 
evidence demonstrates, is pyramidal scheme22. 
 The empirical evidence confirms that most common categories of controlling shareholders 
are family and state, while bank control through equity ownership is not common. Only 5% of large 
firms are controlled by banks mostly and other financial institutions23. Bank control is much higher 
in countries with poor shareholder protection compared to countries with good shareholder 
protection. Equity ownership by banks is small outside Germany, Belgium and Japan. Thus, 
ownership of financial institutions does not play major role in corporate governance, but in 
Germany and Japan banks influence governance using mechanisms other then ownership – lending 
and board representation. In Germany and Japan banks gain significant powers through seats in the 
board of directors or through voting equity of other investors.  
Countries with good shareholder protection have 48% of widely held firms as opposed to 
27% in countries with poor shareholder protection. In countries with poor shareholder protection  
there are 34% of family controlled firms and 22% of state controlled as opposed to 25% family 
                                                 
16Stock markets in Netherlands are relatively highly liquid and have high value due to a small number of very large 
multinational firms. Sweden also has large and liquid equity market despite high concentration of ownership. According 
to, Berglòf, E., (1997), takeovers in continental Europe are devices for withdrawal of firms from stock exchanges rather 
than to replace managers and change control.   
17Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K., (1985), Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1986). 
18See: Barka, F., (1996) and  Bianco, M., Gola, C. and Signiorini, L.F., (1996). 
19La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1999). 
20Cross-shareholdings is legally limited or restricted in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Korea and Spain. According 
to the study of La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), this mechanism is more used in countries 
where it is restricted. 
21Participation of shareholders in management reduces agency problems of separation between owners and managers 
but enhances the problem of separation cash flow rights from private benefits.  
22Results of La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., (1999) are consistent with Barka, F.,(1995). 
23La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), p. 502. 
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controlled and 14% of state controlled in countries with good shareholder protection. It seems that 
in the countries with poor shareholder protection, family controlled large firms and state 
controlled24 large firms are the rule.  
3.1.1. The Costs and Benefits of Governance Structures 
 Dispersed ownership gives to the owners less incentive to monitor because of the free-rider 
problem25 Costs of monitoring are higher than expected benefits from the monitoring. Free rider 
problem may prevent the transfer of control over company to those who would be the most efficient 
managers26. Possible safeguards are: the exit by selling shares (including takeovers and 
management turnover) and the comprehensive system of fiduciary duties that require from the 
board and entrepreneur to act in the interest of non-controlling owners.  
Concentrated ownership mitigates free-riders problems of corporate control and as a 
consequence, owners are more active in exercising control over managers. Finance literature 
attributes benefits to the role of large shareholders assuming that they have right incentives and 
skills to monitor managers. Different kinds of large and active shareholders exist and thus different 
is the working of corporate governance systems. As empirical evidence demonstrates regarding the 
relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance, corporate performance 
initially rises with low levels of concentrated ownership and than falls with high levels27. A 
common implication of many models of corporate governance is that firms with more concentrated 
ownership structures, but otherwise identical, trade at higher prices as there is a higher incentive on 
the part of owners to monitor the firm and make the necessary changes in management.28   
Concentrated ownership (large shareholdings) reduces diversification opportunities. Because 
of that investors want to extract private benefits29 from the firm. So, control that is exercised by 
majority shareholders (insiders - like directors and families in Italy) is influenced by private 
benefits. Conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders is inevitable. Majority and 
minority shareholders' interests are not likely to be aligned when decision about the reallocation of 
control is to be made (transfer30 of control through sales, takeovers, etc.). The evidence from Italy 
confirms that majority shareholders enjoy large private benefits, not less than 18% of the total 
                                                 
24In Austria 70% of the largest firms, in Singapore 45% of the largest firms, in Israel 45% of the largest firms and Italy 
45% of the largest firms are controlled by state. See:  La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., (1999), p. 
496. 
25Demsetz, H.,(1983). 
26Grossman and Hart, O.,(1986). 
27McConnel, J.J. and Servaes, H., (1990). 
28Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., (1997). 
29See Demsety, H. and Lehn, K., (1985). 
30For rules that protect minority shareholders in a process of acquisition see: Zingales, L.,(1994a).  
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market value of the median corporation31 of the sample. Private benefits of the majority 
shareholders dissuade outside (non-controlling) investors to offer capital to the firm. So, costs of 
shareholders conflict may be incurred by the fall of the global value of the firm and thus the value 
of its shares. 
The problem how to align cash flow rights with control rights is differently addressed by 
concentrated and dispersed ownership and corresponding governance structures and financial 
markets. Empirical evidence supports assumption that private benefits from control rights32 are 
more important when shareholder protection is poor. Moreover, it is confirmed that ownership 
concentration is negatively correlated with shareholder legal protection. Weak protection of non-
controlling investors reduces external finance and as a consequence equity markets are smaller and 
managers are less effectively controlled by the market for corporate control. So, development33 of 
financial markets is positively correlated with shareholder legal protection. Italy, France and 
Germany have relatively small public equity markets.  
The issue of control is extensively discussed in the light of ownership and governance 
structures and financial systems. Corporations do not usually deviate from one-share-one-vote 
principle34, not even when it is legally allowed. Findings demonstrate that multiple classes of shares 
are not major methods for separating ownership from control. Cross-shareholding is not of 
significance in separating ownership from control except in Sweden and Germany. It looks like that 
cross-shareholding has more significance in countries where it is forbidden35. Separation of 
ownership and control is of practical relevance because control rights exercised by controlling 
shareholders may be significantly in disproportion of their cash flow rights. On average, it takes 
18,6% of capital to control 20% of votes36. In poor shareholder protection countries, it takes on 
average 17,7% of capital to control 20% of votes and in good protection countries 19,7% of capital 
to control 20% of votes37.  Large shareholders prefer to maximize private benefits of control as a 
substantial part of their wealth38.  
 A great deal of evidence39 about equity trade at a substantial premium confirms that control 
over firm is valued. The level of voting premium differs according to the managers’ or controlling 
shareholders’ opportunity to gain benefits. It ranges, as evidence indicates, from 6,5% reported for 
                                                 
31See: Caprio, L. and Floreani, A.,(1996), p. 18. 
32About the private benefits of control see: Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., (1976), Grossman, S. and Hart,O., (1988) and 
Haris, M. and Raviv, A., (1988). 
33Development of financial market is indicated by stock market capitalization and liquidity.  
34Scandinavian countries significantly deviate in this regard. 
35It is forbidden in Italy, Germany, France, Korea, Spain and  Belgium (out of the sample of 27 countries). 
36See: La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., (1999).  
37See: La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., (1999), p.498. 
38Jensen, M., (1986).  
39See: Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997), Zingales, L., (1995) and Zingales, L., (1994b). 
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Sweden to 82% that is reported premium on the Milan Stock Exchange40. And for example, as a 
consequence of a more dispersed ownership or modest concentration, superior voting rights in the 
US are traded at small premium. Prices of firms incorporate the effects of ownership and corporate 
governance on future firm performance41.  
Established ownership patterns and governance structures imply the liquidity of financial 
market. Reduced liquidity of financial markets, because financial instruments are held by small 
number of investors, is a cost of concentrated ownership. And vice versa, low liquidity of financial 
markets may preserve the existing ownership concentration. Moreover, it can preserve the existing 
poor legal protection of investors. 
3.2.  Legal Rules, Financial Systems and Corporate Finance: Access to External Finance  
Differences in company laws (legal rules) around the world do not necessarily imply 
differences in protection of investors42.  
On the other side, there is strong evidence43 that differences in legal rules that reflect 
different levels of investor protection affect the development of financial markets and the firms’ 
access to external capital. In that case inefficiency of legal rules are more or less successfully 
substituted (compensated) by economic devices like more concentrated ownership. “The various 
rules and institutions may well substitute and complement each other in ways that produce the same 
outcome”.44 Fairly similar level of economic development of G-7 countries that belong to different 
legal origin could be the result of institutional substitution. The US and the UK belong to common 
law legal origin characterized by the best legally protected investor rights. Next four countries are 
civil law countries, with France and Italy belonging to French civil law subgroup that protects the 
least, and with Japan and Germany belonging to the German civil law subgroup that gives 
protection that is between common law and French civil law subgroup. Canada is characterized by 
bijuridism – common law and civil law legal origin in its different parts. 
Strong correlation between poor investor protection and ownership concentration and 
smaller and less liquid capital markets stands contrary to the homogenous development of G-7 
countries of which France and Italy and part of Canada belong to the poorest investor protection 
                                                 
40For Italy see Zingales, L., (1994b) and for some other countries see Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997).  
41See evidence from the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in Classens, S., (1997). 
42For example, rules protecting minority shareholders in the stage of control transfer differ across countries. Equal 
opportunity rule is accepted in the UK and (similar) at the EU level. Market rule is common in the US. It allows the 
transfer of controlling block at a premium without obligation for mandatory buyout but it is observed that it is almost 
usual  for companies to regulate this issue by provision of so-called "fair price amendment" in their charters. Practices 
based on different rules have the same results and demonstrate that contractual parties protect their interests the best. 
43La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997). The study compares legal rules using a 
sample of 49 countries. For data and variables see p. 1133-1137. 
44Berglòf, E., (1997).  
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countries (French legal origin subgroup). Thus, research should be directed to answer broader 
question – does strong correlation between legal rules/origin and development of financial markets 
affect economic growth. There are empirical investigations about correlation between development 
of financial systems and economic growth45, but study of specific properties of legal systems, 
corresponding financial markets and growth has yet to be undertaken.  
Further part of this section presents the findings that confirm strong correlation between the 
investor protection, ownership concentration and the liquidity of financial markets. Differences in 
legal rules across countries are captured by quality of investor (shareholder and creditor) protection 
and by different legal origins. The common law countries protect investors the most and have the 
most developed financial markets46. Among civil law countries, French subgroup protects the least 
and German and Scandinavian subgroups are between common law and French civil law subgroup. 
Using three measures for the extent of equity financing47, the study demonstrates that common law 
countries provide better access to equity finance than civil law countries, particularly French 
subgroup. The average ratio of outside held stock to GNP is 60%, 21%, 46% and 30% for common 
law, French subgroup, German subgroup and Scandinavian subgroup respectively. The average 
number of listed firms per million population is 35, 10, 5 and 27 for common law, French subgroup, 
German subgroup and Scandinavian subgroup. It is interesting that in France 8 listed firms are 
reported while in Germany 5 and in Italy only 4 per million of population. Reported number of 
IPOs per million of population in the period between mid. 1995 – mid. 1996 is 2.2, 0.2, 0.12 and 2.1 
for common law origin, French, German and Scandinavian subgroups respectively. The reported 
IPOs in the US are 803, in Germany 7 and in France 10.  
 As far association between creditor rights and debt financing is concerned48, results suggest 
that creditor protection influence49 debt financing. Aggregate debt as a share of GNP is 68%, 45%, 
97% and 57% in common law countries, French, German and Scandinavian subgroup respectively. 
Micro data on debt that covered large firms only, demonstrate that large firms get debt finance 
irrespectively of the legal rules and creditor protection.  
                                                 
45Financial sector development measured as the level of financial intermediation and share of private ownership in the 
financial sector is important to explain economic growth. See King, R. and Levine, R., (1993). The likelihood of the 
view that legal arrangements that shape financial markets affect growth is derived by Berglòf, E., (1997) following 
findings of La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F.,Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997) and findings of King, R. and Levin, 
R., (1993). Also, see: Levine, R. and Zervos, S., (1998) and Rayan, R. and Zingales, L.,(1998).  
46For the arguments that common law is more efficient than statutory law see Posner, R.A., (1992). 
47Three measures of equity financing used in the study are capitalization of equity held by outsiders, number of listed 
firms per million population and number of IPOs per million population. See: La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, 
F.,Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997), p. 1137. 
48See: La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F.,Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997), p. 1145-1146. 
49If legal origin is included, creditor rights are not significant. Unusually high debt levels, compared to aggregate ratio 
of liabilities to GNP, are reported for large firms in countries with heavy government regulation. 
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It is not confirmed that bank-oriented systems have greater reliance on debt50. Distinction 
between bank-oriented and market-oriented system is vague regarding the role of banks, so 
distinction between strong-bank countries and weak-bank countries might be more useful51.  
It is interesting that there is not significant difference in the incidence of widely held firms 
among strong and weak bank countries52. Contrary to expectations, greater reliance on bank finance 
is associated with the greater incidence of widely held firms. Empirical results demonstrates that 
well developed equity markets go hand in hand with well developed debt markets and that both are 
consequence of good legal investor protection. So, the results show systematic difference between 
countries belonging to different legal origin. Common law countries have more developed capital, 
as well as debt markets.  
Taking into consideration the differences in common law and civil law legal origins, our 
opinion is that civil law weaknesses in legal investor protection and consequently less developed 
financial markets may be compensated by reduced informational costs due to the large 
shareholdings. Smaller and less liquid financial markets, and developed financial markets serve 
better different purposes. For example, countries with better developed financial systems, have 
superior growth in capital intensive sectors because these sectors naturally rely on external 
finance53. Also, the preliminary empirical evidence on performance of different governance models 
in Italy, confirms54 that some models perform better in some sectors. Family and coalition control 
perform slightly better in traditional and specialization sector. Group control performs well in high 
technology sectors where large investments are needed. This is the evidence that firms organized in 
groups are less financially constrained. Also, it means that pyramidal group control substitutes 
financial institutions. Another question, regarding the relationship of legal rules, corporate finance 
and capital markets, is whether financial markets are developed according to investment needs of 
the economy sectors or economy sectors are developed according to the available access to financial 
markets.  
                                                 
50Rayan, R. and Zingales, L., (1995) didn’t find higher leverage in bank-oriented systems. 
51Distinction between strong bank countries and weak bank countries is based on whether banks are allowed to own 
majority stakes in firms and to invest more than 60% of their capital portfolio in firms. The United Kingdom for 
example, belongs to strong bank countries. Italy, Japan and the United States, among others, belong to the weak bank 
countries. See: La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A (1999). There is not significant difference in the 
incidence of widely held firms in strong and weak bank countries, neither in market oriented and in bank oriented 
financial systems. Shareholder protection is crucial for the incidence of widely held firms.    
52In testing the association of legal rules and ownership patterns, La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 
(1999) corroborate the results of La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997) that tested the 
association of legal rules with the access to external finance. 
53 See: Rayan, R. and Zingales, L., (1998). 
54Cesari, R. and Salvo, G. (1996) regressed various performance variables (profits, growth of sales, growth of 
employment, sales per employee corrected for industry effects) on the firm's control model controlling for size, age, 
period of the last transfer of control and industry, p. 25. Regarding that ownership concentration influences control 
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Corporate financing according to all empirical data mostly relies on internally generated 
funds. Bank credits are the largest external source of finance regardless the differences in financial 
systems. The evidence that different financial systems are not associated with fundamentally 
different ways of financing firms supports our assumption that combinations of different legal and 
economic devices work as substitutes. In all financial systems (whatever the legal protection of 
investors), as confirmed by the empirical evidence, large firms have rather easy access to external 
finance.  
Conclusion55 that more investor protection (captured by legal origin) is always desired 
because it develops financial markets is simply incorrect. Excessive legal protection reduces 
entrepreneurial innovative activity, thus efficiency. So, our view is that optimal legal rules 
(protection) would be derived from practice as a complement to economic efficiency devices. The 
combination of certain types of economic and legal devices (like concentrated ownership, large 
shareholders control, smaller and narrower financial markets and weaker legal protection of 
investors) and their effectiveness is a substitute for some other combinations of economic and legal 
devices (like dispersed ownership, liquid financial markets and good legal protection of investors). 
 This paper tries to direct the future research of corporate governance and financial systems 
to understanding and explanations how countries “like Italy have managed to develop so strongly 
over the last 30 years despite apparent weaknesses in basic legal structure and investor 
protection?”56 The Italian model57of corporate governance and financial market is based on the 
family and coalition control58, state control and control derived from pyramidal group system. 
Another characteristic is that larger firms are more concentrated than small ones. It is to the highest 
degree favorable to majority shareholders. One of the Italian peculiarities is that privately held 
companies are the rule, even when the companies are the largest ones. The limited role of the Italian 
stock market and insignificant role of banks and other financial institutions is, therefore, the 
consequence. The Italian market for transfer of corporate control is segmented. It comprises of the 
intra-family transfers as one of the Italian peculiarities, and of non-family market transfers. The 
prevailing legal forms of corporations within pyramidal groups are privately held company and 
partnerships. These forms are chosen in order to keep the certainty of control within family and 
coalition groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
model and financial system as well, the obtained results confirm our assumption about the substitution between legal 
and economic devices.   
55La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1997). 
56Berglòf; E., (1997), p. 114. 
57See: Barka, F., (1996), Barka, F., (1997), Cesari, R. and Salvo, G., (1996), Bianco, M., Gola, S. and Signorini, L.F., 
(1996), Pagano, M., Panetta, F. and Zingales, L., (1998).  
58Preservation of family control is possible explanation for preemptive clauses in company charters and it also explains 
why privately held corporation as legal form prevails among the Italian companies. 
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We argue that the model of Italian corporate governance and financial market has evolved in 
efforts to find substitutes for efficient governance devices. Family and coalition control substitutes 
fiduciary duties. Pyramidal groups is a device for concentrating ownership and substitute the role of 
financial institutions.  
3.2.1. Legal Rules and Capital Structure as Specific Governance Arrangement  
Capital structure could be understood as specific governance arrangement that is, as any 
governance structure, affected by the level of legal protection of investors. Incomplete contracting 
view and transaction costs approach provide a theoretical framework to analyze financial decisions. 
In deciding what capital structure to choose, a firm makes trade off between costs and benefits. 
 Any method of outside finance (different classes of debt or equity instruments) of the 
company is associated with agency costs because managers cannot be fully and costlessly 
controlled59. Moreover, different methods of outside finance involve different types of opportunistic 
behavior associated with different level of agency costs. Capital structure may be chosen to 
minimize the sum of agency costs. Financial institutions such as banks and non-bank intermediaries 
serve as efficient devices for reducing some types of opportunistic behavior.60  
Capital structure mitigates managerial incentives to divert income from shareholders and to 
more closely align divergent interests of managers and shareholders. It is observed that various 
mixes of financial instruments (standard debt and equity contracts, as well as more complicated 
financial instruments) implicitly shape governance structures.  The optimal debt level balances the 
probability of acquisition and bankruptcy and matters when investors make their decisions whether 
to invest.  
So, the choice between retained earnings, financial intermediaries or public security offering 
on stock markets matters for the efficiency of corporation and its price. The role of capital structure 
is to reduce the costs of capital. Countries with better legal protection of investors have more 
external finance in the form of higher valued and broader capital markets. 
Corporate financing mostly relies on internally generated funds. Bank credits are the largest 
external source of finance61 regardless the differences in financial systems. Regarding capital 
structure62, little difference is found in the relative importance between debt and equity finance in 
the bank-oriented and market-oriented G7 countries. Differences in their legal systems, particularly 
                                                 
59Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, (1976). 
60See: Diamond, D., (1991). A gency costs are cheaper because intermediaries are well devised and have knowledge for 
monitoring and because they have knowledge how to reduce them by well diversified portfolio. 
61Franks, J. and Mayer, C., (1990). It is suggested that the UK and the US use more internal funds than France, 
Germany and Japan. 
62Similar levels of leverage are found in G-7 countries in spite of considerable institutional differences. See: Rajan, R. 
and Zingales, L., (1995). 
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bankruptcy codes did not affect the level of leverage. It is surprising that debt finance is more 
important for the UK than for the German companies and that large German firms use little of bank 
loans63.  
4. Economic and Legal Devices in the Light of Reforms and Policy Prescriptions 
The reviewed studies present fairly consistent results in assessing the importance of legal 
rules in shaping ownership patterns, governance structures, corporate finance and financial markets. 
If we reverse the causation line, the main conclusion that we derive from their findings is that 
ownership patterns, governance structures, corporate finance and financial markets place different 
“demands” on legal institutions.  
 Concentrated ownership (large shareholders) does not demand heavy legal intervention.  
Thus, large shareholders may rely on basic legal protection. In some countries it is easy to form a 
controlling block if minority shareholders are poorly protected. It is suggested, that in that case, 
focus of the corporate governance reform should be shifted to legal and regulatory setting of the 
capital markets. The real problem is in well balanced legal protection of minority because they do 
not have power (control) to protect themselves. So, laws should provide their protection that 
shareholders would provide for themselves in their corporate charters if they had opportunity to 
contract without transaction costs.  
Legal protection across countries goes from substantive - mandatory rules and default 
(enabling rules that are choice variables in corporate charters), to procedural rules.64. The optimal 
level of protection, and generally the best structure of corporate law cannot be derived from theory. 
It evolves from practice65. Enabling and procedural rules better work against opportunism than 
mandatory rules. 
 In spite of the differences of corporate governance systems relying on different financial 
systems, it could not be said what is the best system. They have different costs and benefits and 
serve to different purposes. The differences between the US, the UK, Germany and Japan66 are 
smaller compared to their differences to other countries. The common law origin and German civil 
law subgroup provide the best legal protection associated with corresponding governance and 
financial systems. Japan falls between the US and Germany regarding the degree of protection of 
both - shareholder and creditor rights. They work differently compared to systems of the French 
                                                 
63See: Edvards, J. and Nibler, M., (2000).  
64For the problems in creating company law in transition economies see Black, B., Kraackman, R. and Hay, J., (1996).  
65See: Easterbrook, F. and Fishel, D., (1991). 
66Japan cannot be anymore characterized as one of the most successful financial systems because of  huge amount of 
bad loans. In spite of significant power of banks through the seats in the board of directors and through voting of other 
investors’ equity, the problems of bad loans require the revision of devices for  investors’ protection and their 
enforcement.   
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civil law subgroup with poor legal protection of investors but associated with more concentrated 
ownership (equipped with different economic device). Different legal rules and different economic 
institutions may complement or substitute each other and may produce similar outcomes. Most of 
the corporate governance and financial systems around the world are not like the most successful 
ones – the US, the UK and Germany. Most of the systems are more similar to the Italian financial 
system where legal protection of investors is poor. In most of the governance and financial systems, 
firms are controlled by family and state and have difficulties in accessing external finance67. It is 
hard for firms to obtain external financing and most of debt financing comes from state banks. As 
well established pattern, firms are predominantly internally financed.  
Our opinion on the issue of causality68 regarding the relationship between law and financial 
systems, is that one direction causation cannot be established. Most of the systems are based on less 
substantial legal protection and in these systems economic devices (for example, concentrated 
family ownership and control) are substitutes for poor legal devices.  Or inversely, concentrated 
ownership “demands” just basic legal protection. Legal protection is just one dimension of 
protection against opportunistic behavior. Corporate ownership patterns, governance patterns, 
financial patterns and implied financial markets influence the creation of legal system. Evolution of 
legal system and its origin is the consequence of the workings of economic forces. Thus economic 
forces shape legal rules and vice versa. 
 Ownership patterns, governance structures and financial markets are relatively stable over  
time, legal systems as well. Thus, it is unlikely to impose one structure to dominate over another. 
The question is what purpose serve different governance structures and financial markets. Each 
system has its costs and benefits, comparative advantages and shortcomings. Each system provides 
a different means for reducing opportunistic behavior. Attempts to implement only one type of 
ownership pattern, governance structure and financial system contradict to understanding that 
institutions evolve as a spontaneous response to the problems of informational asymmetry. They are 
different because their differences make them better suited to solve different agency problems. The 
transition countries proved that legal reforms are not sufficient to impose desired ownership pattern, 
governance structure and financial system. “The system of corporate control is an integral part of 
the corporate culture landscape of any country”.69 
                                                 
67Reported by Pagano, M., Panetta, F. and Zingales, L., (1998). 
68The arguments for the same stand on the issue of causality see: Berglòf, E., (1997).  
69Schneider-Lenne, E.R., (1992), p.22. 
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5. Transition Economies and Legal Tradition 
Transition economy, for political reasons, relied on variety of models. Consequently, a 
variety of governance structures were created. In most of the transition economies capital markets 
are still underdeveloped. Insider privatization and consequently insider ownership structure 
(employee and managerial ownership70) were inefficient in enterprise restructuring. In Russia71, for 
example, controlling owners were managers whose rights comprised of cash flow rights together 
with almost complete control rights. This is a consequence of the very poor protection of non-
controlling shareholders.  The Czech Republic72 experience suggests that large shareholdings 
controlled by banks and mutual funds play a significant role in corporate governance. Direct sale of 
assets is the only method of privatization that unambiguously created efficient governance 
structures. 
Transition indicator scores for 2000 have shown the largest improvement since 1997.  
Nevertheless, institutional development of market supporting institutions (banking and financial 
institutions, competition policy, corporate governance and enterprise restructuring) has lagged 
behind the progress in liberalization and privatization. 
Three patterns are observed between progress in liberalization/privatization and institutional 
development. One pattern is balanced progress in liberalization/privatization and institutional 
development like in Hungary and in most of the central European countries. The second is rapid 
initial liberalization in the first half of decade, followed by strong institutional reform in the second 
half of decade like in Lithuania and the Baltic states. Third pattern is observed when rapid initial 
liberalization was not followed by subsequent institutional reforms like it was in Georgia and less 
advanced transition economies. In creating market economies, legal rules and their enforcement 
play crucial role in building market-supporting institutions, as vice versa, the development of 
market-supporting institutions develops legal rules and their enforcement.  
Progress in institutional development in the area of financial institutions and financial 
markets required strengthening of legal protection of investors, particularly as reported, 
harmonization of banking regulations with international standards, strengthening bankruptcy laws, 
modernizing company and securities laws and strengthening enforcement of laws. The close 
association has been demonstrated between the improvements in financial market regulation, 
enterprise restructuring and corporate governance with the promotion of foreign equity investments 
                                                 
70About (in)efficiency of employees’ and managerial ownership see Frydman, R., Gray, C.W. and Rapaczynski, A., 
(eds.), (1996). 
71See: Boyko, M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (1995).   
72Claessens, S., (1997). 
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and lending73. The problem, as evidence in transition economies demonstrates, is predominantly in 
the domain of enforcement74 and not in quality of laws. Governments wanted to avoid shortcomings 
of the established governance structures by implementing different methods for remaining 
privatization - direct sales through tenders and auctions. Also, in order to improve ownership and 
governance structures resulting from previous voucher and management-employee buy-outs, they 
tried to promote firms restructuring through market for corporate control and external financing. 
These devices did not perform well in many countries75. Governments passed new modern laws, but 
their enforcement depended on deeply rooted legal tradition and acquired knowledge of business 
people and legal profession. Rapid legal changes are sometimes counterproductive. The quality of 
laws, thus, cannot be chosen according to the desired outcome but according to the economic 
pressures within the system and legal tradition.   
In creating market economies, legal reform plays crucial role together with building 
supporting market institutions. It was expected that key commercial and financial codes 
approximate internationally achieved standards76 and to achieve the internationally accepted degree 
of their enforcement. On the other side, legal framework of emerging market economies should be 
consistent with the legal tradition and level of economic development of each country. The need for 
consistency explains why enactment of new laws previously unfamiliar to the legal tradition of the 
country reduces the level of law enforcement77. Empirical results suggest that law enforcement is 
more important for financial market development than the quality of the laws78. Also, the choice of 
legal rules has to correspond to legal and broader cultural tradition of each country. 
Conclusion 
Practical conclusions derived from the summary of presented empirical studies and their 
findings regarding association of legal rules and corporate governance and financial systems are as 
follows: There is not a better system in general, but better for certain purposes. Ownership patterns, 
governance structures, corporate finance and financial markets place different “demands” on legal 
institutions. Recent empirical studies demonstrated that the cultural, historical and other differences 
                                                 
73See: EBRD Transition Report 2000, London.  
74The evidence for transition economies is consistent with the findings of the numerous empirical studies about the 
significance of law enforcement (or rule of law) for the size, breath and liquidity of developed markets and for the 
establishing efficient ownership patterns and governance structures.  
75See: EBRD Transition Report 2000,London. 
76EBRD has developed measures to assess the extensiveness (content of laws which is adequate to international 
standards) and effectiveness (level of enforcement adequate to international standards). See: EBRD Transition Report 
2000, p.33. 
77The explanation is that judicial profession is not familiar with it and not willing to accept it. See: and Pistor, K., 
Raiser, M. and Gelfer, S., (2000). The problem is that courts and legal profession in transition economies do not 
understand business and do not have knowledge how to implement sophisticated rules.  
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would not allow the adoption of one single model of governance and financial system. A single 
model of financial market should not be imposed because different models serve different purposes 
and that is reflected in consequent costs and benefits. Most of the corporate governance and 
financial systems have less substantial legal protection than the most successful ones. Legal reforms 
that would enhance protection of investors are recommended in many studies. The idea is to change 
company laws by giving explicit rights to shareholders and/or to regulate financial markets. The 
recommendation are given in expectations that results will be directed toward the higher incidence 
of widely held firms and corresponding governance structures and toward broader and more liquid 
and valuable equity markets. However, a degree of freedom for policy makers is bounded by 
informal institutions – norms and social values as well, and legal rules are not sufficient to create 
(design) desired ownership patterns, governance structures, capital structures and financial markets.  
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